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Hedonic Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits
John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur†
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the burgeoning psychological literature on happiness
and hedonic adaptation (a person‘s capacity to preserve or recapture her level of
happiness by adjusting to changed circumstances), bringing this literature to bear on
a previously overlooked aspect of the civil litigation process: the probability of pretrial settlement. The glacial pace of civil litigation is commonly thought of as a
regrettable source of costs to the relevant parties. Even relatively straightforward
personal injury lawsuits can last for as long as two years, delaying the arrival of
necessary redress to the tort victim and forcing the litigants to expend ever greater
quantities of resources. Yet these procedural delays are likely to have salutary
effects on the litigation system as well. When an individual first suffers a serious
injury, she will likely predict that the injury will greatly diminish her future
happiness. However, during the time that it takes her case to reach trial the
aggrieved plaintiff is likely to adapt hedonically to her injury—even if that injury is
permanent—and within two years will report levels of happiness very close to her
pre-injury state. Consequently, the amount of money that the plaintiff believes will
fairly compensate her for her injury—will ―make her whole,‖ in the typical parlance
of tort damages—will decrease appreciably. The sum that the plaintiff is willing to
accept in settlement will decline accordingly, and the chances of settlement
increase—perhaps dramatically. The high costs of prolonged civil litigation are thus
likely to be offset substantially by the resources saved as adaptive litigants succeed
in settling before trial.

INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most important recent development in social
science research is the emergence of an interdisciplinary group of
psychologists, economists, and public policy analysts devoted to the
study of happiness, or, as it is known in the literature, hedonics.1
Investigators have begun to ask questions about the kinds of things
that make people happy, about people‘s ability to predict what will
make them happy, and about the intensity and duration of changes in
†
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1
See WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1999).
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happiness.2 The answers to these questions have challenged some of
the fundamental tenets of psychological and economic theory.3 They
also have significant practical implications for medicine, public policy,
business, and, of course, the law. The legal implications of the new
happiness research are only now being realized, and this Article is the
first to apply these findings to the settlement of civil litigation.
Among the most important and robust findings of hedonic
psychology is the discovery that many positive and negative life
events—including significant changes such as winning the lottery,
being denied tenure, and becoming disabled—have little long-term
effect on well-being.4 Immediately after experiencing these and other
events, people show substantial changes in reported happiness, but in
the weeks, months, and years that follow, people undergo a process of
―hedonic adaptation‖ that nullifies the effect of the change and returns
them to a pre-event level of well-being. This adaptation occurs, in
part, because people tend to shift their attention away from the few
new things brought about by the change and back towards the
mundane features of daily life.5 While many changes are subject to
adaptation within a couple of years, others, it seems, tend to be
unadaptable—particularly those injuries that cause constant or
worsening pain.6
Concomitantly, although people often experience hedonic
adaptation to major life events, researchers have found that people fail
to recognize and remember adaptation‘s effects.7 An overwhelming
body of evidence now shows that when people are asked to predict
how future changes are likely to affect their well-being, they make
significant errors in their estimations of both the intensity of the
change and its duration. Thus, healthy people tend to predict that
becoming disabled will have a more substantial impact on their well2

Id. at ix.
See Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo, Introduction, in 1 THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS, at xii (Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo, eds. 2003).
4
Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman writes, ―The fundamental surprise of wellbeing research is the robust finding that life circumstances make only a small
contribution to the variance of happiness . . . .‖ Daniel Kahneman, Experienced
Utility and Objective Happiness, in 1 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS,
supra note 3, at 199.
5
On the role of attention in adaptation, see infra notes 85-87.
6
On the differences between adaptable and unadaptable injuries, see infra notes
78-82.
7
See Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in
Affective Forecasting, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 617 (1998).
3
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being and that the impact will last longer than it actually does. In
effect, they ignore the strength and speed of hedonic adaptation.8
In this Article, we apply this research on hedonic adaptation to
the settlement of civil lawsuits. Specifically, we examine the likely
effects of adaptation on a plaintiff seeking the recovery of pain and
suffering or punitive damages in a personal injury suit. Following the
research on hedonic psychology, we suggest that such a plaintiff, when
making her initial settlement demands shortly after her injury, will
tend to overestimate both the severity and the duration of her injury.
Her attention will be drawn towards the novel and painful features of
the injury, and, like most people, she will fail to recognize the extent
to which hedonic adaptation will enable her to cope with her new
circumstances. During the many months that she will have to wait
before trial, she will begin to experience the effects of hedonic
adaptation, lifting her perception of her own well-being, and, we
suggest, making her more willing to settle for a lower and more
accurate sum.
The legal literature is replete with attempts to weigh the
benefits of additional trial processes—error reduction, fairness to
litigants, improved opportunities to participate—against the
administrative costs of delay.9 Indeed, modern due process doctrine is
largely organized along these lines.10 Yet while all of these analyses
count trial delays as pure economic losses, we propose that, by
allowing plaintiffs time to adapt to their injuries, such delays may
result in a beneficial increase in settlements. Accordingly, we suggest
that current accountings of drawn-out trial processes have understated
the benefits that extended procedure can provide.
Part I of this Article sets out the principal law and economics
model of civil settlement as well as recent challenges to the model
8

This research is further discussed at infra notes 88-91.
For a particularly incisive treatment of these questions, see Adam M. Samaha,
Undue Process, 59 STAN. L. REV. 601 (2006).
10
See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (―More
precisely, our prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of
due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the
private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.‖).
9
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drawn from psychological research. In Part II, we elaborate on the
social scientific research on hedonic adaptation and affective
forecasting, and we survey the few legal scholars who have devoted
attention to these discoveries. In Part III, we apply the findings of
hedonic psychology to the settlement of personal injury lawsuits, and
in Part IV, we offer a series of empirically testable predictions about
such lawsuits and reflect on potential implications and objections.
I. THE FACTORS THAT DRIVE CASES TOWARD SETTLEMENT
For the past quarter-century, perhaps no topic relating to the
American civil justice system has received more scholarly attention
than the attempt to understand what distinguishes lawsuits that settle
from those that go to trial. Fewer than two percent of federal civil
lawsuits go to trial,11 but any case that does so presents a puzzle for
law and economics. The value of a lawsuit can be monetized by
multiplying the probability of winning by the amount to be won, and
then that value can be paid in settlement, avoiding the large transaction
costs of litigation. Both parties stand to gain handsomely from such a
deal, so why would they ever choose to forgo it in favor of a trial?
Early hypotheses, operating under the assumption that parties
rationally pursue the goal of maximizing wealth or utility, pointed to
bargaining strategies or informational asymmetries as the reasons for
trial. Behavioral law and economics then modified the assumption of
rationality by considering factors that undermine rational choice.
Ultimately, behavioral psychology has indicated that wealth
maximization is not the only goal driving decisions about settlement.
Because other goals—principally, a desire for an outcome perceived as
fair—influence the decision whether to settle, that decision would be
affected in turn by a plaintiff‘s changing perception over time of the
sum that constitutes fair compensation.
This Part briefly sketches the time that elapses during the
litigation process. It then surveys the development of the literature on
settlement, describing the analytical framework we aim to augment via
insights from the new psychological literature on happiness.
11

Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 459, 462 Table
1 Civil Trials in U.S. District Courts at Ten-Year Intervals, 1962-2002 (2004).
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A. Time in the Litigation Process
Since Charles Dickens wrote about Jarndyce and Jarndyce
more than 150 years ago,12 it has been widely understood and
bemoaned that litigating a civil case all the way through trial takes a
long time. Today, the median interval in federal court between filing
and trial adjudication is about two years.13 Even that figure does not
include the time that elapses before filing, after an injury has occurred,
while the harmed party decides whether to hire a lawyer and pursue a
legal remedy. When that decision is made and a lawyer is found, the
lawyer must investigate whether the issue merits litigation. If so, then
a complaint is filed in the appropriate court.14 The defendant is
notified of the suit by service of process,15 and litigation commences.
First comes the filing of motions, as the defendant‘s lawyer
will submit an answer to the complaint and perhaps a motion to
dismiss the lawsuit.16 The court considers the motion and eventually
rules on it, and if the suit is not dismissed, then discovery begins.
Each party‘s lawyers draft lists of questions (interrogatories) that are
propounded to the opposing party, whose lawyers then draft answers
in consultation with their client.17
After the interrogatories, the parties request from each other all
documents relevant to the case.18 Finding and producing these
documents can be onerous and time-consuming, as can reviewing the
documents to find whatever important information might be contained
within them.19 Then there are depositions.20 Each party‘s lawyers
12

CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Norman Page ed., Penguin Books 1971)
(1853).
13
STATISTICS DIVISION, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2006
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. C-5.
14
See FED. R. CIV. P. 3.
15
FED. R. CIV. P. 4.
16
FED. R. CIV. P. 7, 12.
17
See FED. R. CIV. P. 33.
18
See FED. R. CIV. P. 34.
19
Stephen D. Easton, My Last Lecture: Unsolicited Advice for Future and
Current Lawyers, 56 S.C. L. REV. 229, 240-41 (2004) (―Many civil litigators spend
most or all of their time drafting discovery requests, compiling and reviewing
documents and data to respond to discovery requests, drafting discovery responses,
filing motions for protective orders regarding discovery or motions to compel
discovery, responding to these motions, and otherwise fighting over discovery
issues.‖).
20
E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 30.
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schedule times in which to question witnesses, and then the
questioning occurs.
The parties might then file motions for summary judgment.21
Because this is such an important part of the litigation,22 it can take
considerable time on the part of both lawyers and the court.23 If the
motions are denied, then the next phase is the trial itself. A jury is
empanelled (unless the parties have waived their right to jury trial),24
opening statements are made, witnesses are examined and crossexamined, and finally closing arguments occur before the jury
deliberates.
Of course, few cases continue through all of these phases. A
lawsuit can settle at any time from filing through adjudication, or it
can be terminated by a grant of a motion to dismiss or motion for
summary judgment.25 The point is simply that when a case does not
settle early, the steps it must take to wend its way through the
litigation process to judgment take considerable time.
Along the way, there will typically be ongoing settlement
negotiations between the lawyers with little or no involvement by the
clients, who are not professional negotiators and whose involvement
might therefore run contrary to their own interests.26 Even if these
negotiations have not borne fruit by the time the pre-trial litigation is
nearing completion, a party still has much to gain by settling before
trial. The expense of trial itself can be considerable or even, in some
cases, vast. Not only must the lawyer be paid for every hour spent

21

See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
EDWARD J. BRUNET, MARTIN H. REDISH & MICHAEL A. REITER, SUMMARY
JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW AND PRACTICE 1 (West Group 2d ed. 2000); John
Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO WASH. L. REV. 522, 523 (2007).
23
Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court’s Shimmering
View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 171 (1988) (―The judge deciding a summary judgment question
must along with her law clerks read, research, reflect, hold a hearing, read and
research some more, and often must draft, revise, and issue a lengthy written opinion
as well. Although presiding over a jury trial takes time, it may not take any more of
the judge‘s time than does consideration of the summary judgment motion.‖);
Morton Denlow, Summary Judgment: Boon or Burden?, 37 NO. 3 JUDGES‘ J. 26, 29
(1998).
24
See U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
25
E.g., Bronsteen, supra note 22, at 530.
26
See generally Windle Turley, Creating the Right Settlement Environment,
TRIAL, June, 1994, at 28.
22
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preparing for and performing in court,27 but also expert witnesses may
have to be paid,28 and the court itself must expend its limited resources
on only this case.29 Much is to be saved, therefore, by avoiding trial
even if the parties have failed to avoid the costs of pretrial litigation.
B. The Rational Actor Model of Settlement Decisionmaking
As noted above, a case can settle at any time during the
litigation process. A settlement is possible, of course, only if the
largest amount of money that a defendant is willing to pay exceeds the
smallest amount of money that a plaintiff is willing to accept.30 Early
proponents of law and economics created models that explained when
that circumstance would arise, operating under the assumption that
litigants will act to maximize their wealth.31
In the early 1970s, William Landes and Richard Posner began
to analyze settlement through the lens of law and economics.32
Building on their work, George Priest and Benjamin Klein later
proposed a model of settlement—predicting that when cases fail to
settle, they will be adjudicated in favor of the plaintiff 50% of the
time—that has permeated the literature ever since.33 Landes and
Posner developed the core insight that the cost of litigating a case
opens up a zone of bargaining within which the result for each party
27

D. Theodore Rave, Note, Questioning the Efficiency of Summary Judgment,
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 903 (2006).
28
Bronsteen, supra note 22, at 534-35.
29
Id. at 540-41; Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 421
(1982) (―If cases are disposed of quickly, the time saved can be used to consider
more cases.‖). One commentator has estimated that trials cost federal courts about
$4000 per day (not counting the cost to litigants), and although he was discussing
criminal cases, the costs (such as judicial salary) apply equally to civil cases. David
Wippman, Notes and Comment, The Costs of International Justice, 100 AM. J. INT‘L
L. 861, 868 (2006).
30
Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation
Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 111 (1994)
(―Lawsuits will settle if the defendant‘s maximum offer is higher than the lowest
offer the plaintiff will accept.‖).
31
See id. at 108-09.
32
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973); William M. Landes, An Economic
Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971); see also John P. Gould, The
Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973).
33
George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation,
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
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will be better than the party‘s expected utility from litigating to trial.
Specifically, a litigant will calculate the value (or cost, for a
defendant) of a lawsuit by multiplying the damages by the probability
of winning, then subtracting the cost of litigation.34 If the litigants
each come to a similar assessment of the value of the case, then they
will settle because doing so saves them the transaction costs of
litigation.
For example, suppose that a plaintiff sues for $100,000 in
damages and has a 50% chance of winning at trial. Absent transaction
costs, a risk-neutral plaintiff would accept a settlement offer of no less
than the expected value of the lawsuit: $50,000 (i.e., $100,000 x .5).
And a risk-neutral defendant would be willing to make a settlement
offer of no more than that same expected value: $50,000. The
bargaining zone would be limited to that specific amount, and a case
might well go to trial because settlement would be no better for either
party than trial.
The introduction of transaction costs makes all the difference.
Assume that litigating the case to adjudication would cost the plaintiff
and defendant each $10,000. That would make the expected value of
the litigation $40,000 for the plaintiff and the expected cost $60,000
for the defendant. Any settlement between $40,000 and $60,000
would be better for both parties than a trial. The bargaining zone
would thus be $40,000 to $60,000, and we would expect a settlement
somewhere within that zone.35 Widening the bargaining zone in this
way increases the likelihood of settlement.36 The classic economic
model tells us nothing about the dollar value within that zone for
which the case would settle, but merely that it would be some point in
the range.37 By eliminating the transaction costs of trial, a settlement

34

Richard A. Posner, supra note 32, at 418.
For a similar explanation and example, see Russell Korobkin, Aspirations and
Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7 (2003).
36
See Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About
Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 101 (1990) (―[I]t is natural—as well as
customary in the legal and economic literature—to assume that the likelihood of
settlement is positively related to the width of the settlement zone.‖); Rave, supra
note 27, at 892 (―Generally, the wider the settlement zone, the more likely the case is
to settle.‖). The existence and size of the bargaining (or ―settlement‖) zone is, on
this account, the primary condition on which settlement depends. See Korobkin,
supra note 35, at 6.
37
Korobkin, supra note 35, at 8-9.
35
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surplus is created—$20,000 in this example—that will benefit both
parties even if it is divided in a way that does not benefit them equally.
It should be noted that even if the parties were wealthmaximizing rational actors who reached the same assessment of the
probability of a plaintiff victory, settlement would not be assured. A
trial could result from rational but ultimately harmful bargaining
behavior.38 Each side might try to capture most of the settlement
surplus for itself by hard bargaining—telling the opposing party that
the only alternative to such a one-sided deal is a trial (which is an even
less appealing option because it eliminates the entire surplus). Both
parties might play this game of ―chicken‖ all the way to the mutually
unfavorable outcome of an adjudication.39 But this risk might be
outweighed under certain circumstances by the potential benefit of
capturing most of the settlement surplus, making such bargaining
rational.
What emerges from the rational actor model is that two sorts of
things—hard bargaining and differing assessments of a trial‘s likely
outcome—can funnel cases away from settlement and toward
adjudication. These factors might, however, be mitigated to some
degree by the fact that attorneys are sophisticated repeat-players.40
C. Behavioral Modifications of the Rational Actor Model
The classic economic model is based on the assumption that
litigants act rationally to try to maximize their wealth. Still working
within the framework of wealth maximization as the litigants‘ only
goal, several scholars have added nuances or modifications to these
models by emphasizing the limits of human rationality. And more
recently, evidence has emerged that litigants pursue goals other than

38

Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model
of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982); see also Robert H. Mnookin &
Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88
YALE L.J. 950, 972-73, 975-76 (1979).
39
Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 38, at 975.
40
Cf. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and
Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 81 (1997)
(―How does the economic model accurately predict the high rate of settlement if
disputant behavior systematically departs from the assumptions of the model in ways
that suggest lower rates of settlement? One likely answer, we submit, is the role of
lawyers in the litigation system.‖).
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wealth maximization—in particular, that they are far more likely to
accept a settlement offer if they perceive it as fair.
1.

Obstacles to Wealth Maximization

Even when people aim to maximize wealth, they may fail due
to psychological factors that lead them to act irrationally. One such
factor, optimism bias,41 causes both plaintiffs and defendants to
overestimate their prospects of winning at trial.42 This reduces the
likelihood of settlement. If the damages sought are $100,000 and if
the plaintiff and defendant each view their own odds of victory as
65%, then the plaintiff will value the case at $65,000 and the
defendant at $35,000. If settlement would enable each to avoid
$10,000 in costs, that would make the plaintiff willing to accept a
minimum of $55,000 and the defendant willing to offer a maximum of
$45,000. Under these circumstances, no settlement will be reached.
Whereas optimism bias can shrink or even eliminate the
bargaining zone, another set of behavioral considerations known as
prospect theory can shift the zone toward plaintiffs or defendants.
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky have famously demonstrated
that when people face the prospect of a gain, they are risk averse;

41

As might be expected, this psychological trait affects many areas of life
beyond the realm of litigation. Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economic Analysis of
Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1659 (1998) (―An amazingly
robust finding about human actors . . . is that people are often unrealistically
optimistic about the probability that bad things will happen to them. A vast number
of studies support this conclusion. Almost everyone thinks that his or her chances of
having an auto accident, contracting a particular disease, or getting fired from a job
are significantly lower than the average person‘s chances of suffering these
misfortunes; estimates range from twenty to eighty percent below the average
person‘s probability.‖).
42
E.g., George Loewenstein et al., Self-serving Assessments of Fairness and
Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 153 (1992). Loewenstein and his coauthors gave undergraduates a set of facts in an auto accident case, then paired them
off as plaintiffs and defendants and instructed each pair to negotiate a settlement.
Before negotiating, they were asked to guess the judge‘s award in the actual case and
to decide the award they themselves deemed fair. After negotiating, they were asked
to recall the relevant facts of the case. Although all subjects read the same facts,
plaintiffs made substantially higher guesses and fairness determinations than did
defendants, and each side recalled better the facts supporting its own claims than
those that cut in favor of the opposing party. Id. at 145-51.

Hedonic Adaptation

11

whereas when they face the prospect of a loss, they are risk seeking. 43
A settlement is a fixed gain for a plaintiff or loss for a defendant,
whereas a trial holds out the prospect of a larger but uncertain gain or
loss.44 Applying prospect theory to the topic of settlement, Jeffrey
Rachlinski has used experiments to illustrate that plaintiffs can be
expected generally to be irrationally risk averse whereas defendants
can be expected generally to be irrationally risk seeking.45 This
phenomenon does not reduce settlement rates but does shift the
bargaining zone downward, by making plaintiffs willing to settle for
less and defendants unwilling to settle for amounts that risk-neutral
litigants would find acceptable.
These effects reverse when probabilities are low.46 Imagine a
nuisance lawsuit wherein the plaintiff has a very low chance of victory
(say, 1%) but a very high amount of damages were he to win (say, $10
million). The bargaining zone would shift upward because people are
risk-seeking with respect to gains and risk-averse with respect to
losses when probabilities are low (explaining, for example, why they

43

Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 344 (1984); see also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The
Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981);
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
44
One might speculate that, at least under certain circumstances, plaintiffs
would not view the money at stake as a gain and defendants would not view it as a
loss. If, for example, a defendant had taken money from the plaintiff via the
underlying tort or contract violation, then anything less than a full repayment of that
baseline sum could be treated by the defendant as an overall gain and by the plaintiff
as an overall loss. This possibility is mentioned briefly in Part I.C.2, infra.
However, Rachlinski‘s experimental findings suggest otherwise, indicating that
plaintiffs view settlements as gains whereas defendants view them as losses.
45
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S.
CAL. L. REV. 113 (1996). In one experiment, undergraduates were assigned the role
of attorney for either a plaintiff or defendant in a property lawsuit. They were told
the amount the plaintiff stood to gain at trial and the percentage chance of such a
plaintiff victory. Then they were told that the opposing side had offered to settle for
an amount that corresponded to the probability times the amount; e.g., if a trial
victory would yield $100,000 and the plaintiff had a 70% chance to win, then the
offer was $70,000. Far more plaintiff-attorney subjects than defendant-attorney
subjects accepted the offer rather than take the all-or-nothing risk of a trial. Id. at
135-40.
46
Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U.
CHI. L. REV. 163 (2000).
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buy lottery tickets).47 The lowest payment acceptable to the plaintiff
would be a higher number than it would have been if he were risk
neutral, whereas the defendant would be willing to pay a
correspondingly higher sum.
2. Fairness and Goals Other than Wealth Maximization
The above analyses of settlement all retain at least one basic
assumption of the classic economic model: that a litigant‘s goal is to
maximize her wealth.48 She might fail due to imperfect information,
hard bargaining, or cognitive biases, but her objective is not in
question. Important literature in behavioral psychology has suggested,
however, the need to change that assumption. There is evidence that
litigants are not pure wealth maximizers but rather people who also
consider other values like fairness when deciding whether to accept a
settlement offer.49 This evidence corroborates the emphasis that
scholars have long placed on fairness or justice in civil procedure.50

47

Id. at 167 (―When choosing between low-probability gains and losses with
equal expected values, Kahneman and Tversky have found that individuals make
risk-seeking choices when selecting between gains and risk-averse choices when
selecting between losses.‖).
48
More precisely, his goal is to maximize utility, which is defined as wealth
with a built-in accommodation for rational risk-aversion in keeping with the
declining marginal value of money.
49
Fairness is not the only non-monetary consideration that can matter to
litigants. Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement, supra note
40, at 79-80 (―The list of reasons litigants might not behave in accordance with the
[classic economic] model‘s predictions is impressively long: Litigants litigate not
just for money, but to attain vindication; to establish precedent; ‗to express their
feelings‘; to obtain a hearing; and to satisfy a sense of entitlement regarding use of
the courts . . . .‖).
50
E.g., Loewenstein, supra note 42, at 139 (―[S]ubject disputants seemed more
concerned with achieving what they considered to be a fair settlement of the case
than maximizing their own expected value.‖); see also John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss,
The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1448-49 (2003)
(distinguishing between actual justice and adequate settlements in the class action
context); Owen Fiss, Justice Chicago Style, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1 (arguing that
justice is different from efficiency and should be prioritized over it in the civil justice
system); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376, 444-45 (1982)
(expressing the concern that docket pressures may be causing judges wrongly to
value efficiency over justice).
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The stage was set for such evidence by the results of a game
known as ultimatum bargaining.51 In a classic version of such a game,
two people are given a sum of money (say $20) and told that one of
them (the Proposer) will choose how to divide it between them. If the
other (the Accepter) accepts the proposed division, then that division
will be final, but if he rejects it, then neither of the two participants
will receive anything. A rational Proposer would allot $19 (or $19.99,
if the division were not limited to whole numbers) to himself and $1 to
the Accepter, and a rational Accepter would accept the division in
order to receive $1 rather than nothing. But people routinely turn
down such divisions, contrary to economic self-interest. In fact, offers
under 20% of the total are regularly rejected.52 Such behavior
suggests that people care about other values—in particular, their
perceptions of fairness.
Russell Korobkin and Chris Guthrie have conducted
experiments regarding settlement that appear to support this view.53 In
one such experiment, subjects were asked to decide whether to accept
a settlement offer in a hypothetical personal injury case. All subjects
were told that they had been hurt in a car accident through no fault of
their own and that they were suing an insurance company. If they won
at trial, they would receive $28,000 whereas if they lost, they would
receive $10,000 (the amount undisputed by the insurer). Their lawyer
tells them that the result of a trial could go either way, and the
defendant offers to settle for $21,000.54
There were two groups of subjects. Those in Group A were
told that they had owned a car worth $14,000 that was destroyed in the
accident, and those in Group B were told the same thing except that
their car had been worth $28,000. Members of Group B were far less
likely to accept the settlement offer than were members of Group A.55
51

Werner Güth and Reinhard Tietz, Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior: A Survey
and Comparison of Experimental Results, 11 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 417 (1990); see
also Loewenstein, supra note 42, at 142-43.
52
Martin A. Nowak et al., Fairness versus Reason in the Ultimatum Game, 289
SCIENCE 1773 (2000); Karen M. Page & Martin A. Nowak, Empathy Leads to
Fairness, 64 BULL. OF MATHEMATICAL BIOLOGY 1101 (2002). Nowak and
colleagues write, ―The irrational human emphasis on fair division suggests that
players have preferences which do not depend solely on their own payoff…‖ Nowak
et al., supra note 52, at 1773.
53
Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An
Experimental Approach, supra note 30.
54
Id. at 130-33.
55
Id.
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This experiment is particularly revealing. The odds of winning
at trial, the damages sought, and the settlement offer were held
constant for both groups. According to the assumptions of the PriestKlein model, both groups should have viewed the offer similarly.
Because the defendant‘s bargaining behavior was the same in regard to
both groups, the bargaining literature of Cooter and others would
conclude that they should have acted similarly. And because both
groups were faced with prospective gains of the same size, the
behavioral insights of Kahneman and Tversky (applied to settlement
by Rachlinski and Guthrie) do not create a reason for the groups‘
results to diverge.
But they do diverge. One way to characterize the divergence is
as a simple offshoot of the core idea of prospect theory: Group A
views the offer as a gain, and Group B views the offer as a loss.56
Another characterization would be that the subject plaintiffs cared
about values other than maximizing wealth—in particular, that they
cared about achieving a result they viewed as fair compensation for
their loss. Either way, we are left with the conclusion that plaintiffs
compare settlement offers to the amount they have been harmed and
are far more likely to accept offers exceeding that amount.
Such a conclusion has important implications in light of
hedonic adaptation to injury or adversity, as we will see. Due to such
adaptation, a plaintiff‘s assessment of how severely she has been
harmed will often change over time. This change, in turn, can be
expected to affect the range of offers that she will be willing to accept
in order to settle.
D. Putting It All Together
Among the many points that appear in the literature surveyed
in this Part, one simple idea stands out in importance. All
commentators agree that the less money a plaintiff is willing to accept
in order to settle, the more likely settlement will be. Contrary to some
early assumptions, there is now convincing evidence that plaintiffs
may choose their lowest acceptable sum by identifying the amount
they feel would fairly compensate them for the harm they have
suffered.
If a plaintiff‘s perception of what would constitute fair
compensation were to decrease as time passed, then that passage of
56

See id. at 109.
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time would accordingly increase the likelihood of settlement. The
delays associated with litigation could thus have the effect of saving
parties and courts the costs of trial.
II. ADAPTATION TO DISABILITY AND THE FAILURE OF AFFECTIVE
FORECASTING
When estimating the level of fair compensation for their
injuries, plaintiffs must make predictions about the impact those
injuries will have on their future lives. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is
a dearth of legal scholarship addressing how plaintiffs make such
predictions and how accurate their predictions are. Recent social
science research on well-being and prediction now provides clues to
understanding plaintiffs‘ settlement behavior.
Consider this situation. On a scale of 1 to 10, how would you
rate your current happiness? Now suppose that on the way home from
work you are struck by a drunk driver and paralyzed from the waist
down. What do you predict would happen to your happiness
immediately following the accident? How about a year or two years
later? If you are like most people, you would expect that after the
accident your happiness would plummet and that it would remain low
for a long time. You would probably predict that you would never be
as happy as you were during that pleasant afternoon spent in your
office reading an article on the hedonic psychology of legal settlement.
According to a considerable body of recent psychological research,
however, you would likely be wrong. Although your subjectively
reported happiness level would decline immediately following the
accident, social scientists studying people affected by a host of
disabilities—quadriplegia, kidney failure, lost limbs—have found that
the disabled return to pre-disability states of happiness surprisingly
quickly, often within two years.57 Moreover, psychologists have
shown that your failure to anticipate the extent and rapidity of your
recovery isn‘t unusual. Healthy people consistently overestimate how
unhappy a disability would make them, in part because they don‘t
appreciate how quickly they will adapt to their new lives.58
57

For an excellent summary of the initial research on hedonic adaptation, see
Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation, in WELL-BEING: THE
FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999).
58
See Gilbert et al., supra note 7.
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This Part explores recent social scientific research on
adaptation to disability59 and the inability to predict future states of
happiness, known in the literature as the failure of affective
forecasting. We describe the evidence for adaptation as well as
adaptation‘s limits, and we consider how and why people are unable to
anticipate how disabilities will influence their well-being. Although
much of this research is quite new, its implications for the law have
already attracted the notice of psychologists, economists, and legal
scholars. In the final section of this Part, we discuss their proposals.
A. Hedonic Adaptation
In 1999, Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener, and Norbert Schwarz
―announce[d] the existence of a new field of psychology‖—hedonic
psychology—that would study ―what makes experiences and life
pleasant and unpleasant.‖60 Although some psychologists had been
doing research on hedonics for decades, the new hedonic psychology
promised to bring together an interdisciplinary group of social
scientists to ―analyze the full range of evaluative experience, from
sensory pleasure to creative ecstasy, from fleeting anxiety to long-term
depression, from misery to joy.‖61 Using analytic tools that range
from traditional self-evaluation surveys to beeper-activated mood
assessments and longitudinal surveys of national populations, hedonic
psychology is quantifying individual and collective happiness, and it is
measuring the impact that positive and negative life events have on
subjective assessments of well-being. Very often, the results are
surprising. Increased income, for example, does not make people
much happier, but spending more time with family and friends does.62
59

Unless otherwise noted, when we refer to ―disability,‖ we are not using the
term to refer to any specific legally or medically defined injury but rather as a catchall category covering a wide range of injuries, illnesses, and debilities that
potentially affect one‘s health and happiness.
60
Daniel Kahneman et al., Preface to WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF
HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY, at ix (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999).
61
Id.
62
See, e.g., RICHARD LAYARD, HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE
(2005). The economist Richard Easterlin compares how quickly people adapt to
increases in income due to concomitant changes in aspirations and how slowly they
adapt to nonpecuniary benefits like family life. He writes:
In particular, people make decisions assuming that more
income, comfort, and positional goods will make them happier, failing
to recognize that hedonic adaptation and social comparison will come
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Most interestingly for this Article, psychologists have found that most
life events, including apparently devastating ones such as those that
cause disability, actually have little prolonged effect on well-being.
People, it turns out, adapt amazingly quickly to change.
The effects of this hedonic adaptation, understood as any
action, process, or mechanism that reduces the affective (emotional)
consequences of an otherwise stable circumstance, were first detected
in a canonical study on lottery winners and quadri/paraplegics. Asked
to rate their general happiness and current experience of mundane
pleasures, lottery winners were not significantly happier than controls,
and accident victims were not as unhappy as had been expected and
above the mid-point of the scale.63 These data suggested that people
experience life as if on a ―hedonic treadmill‖ such that good and bad
events cause brief changes in well-being with rapid returns to an
established set point.64 Although specific aspects of the treadmill
theory have been challenged,65 a wealth of recent research has
confirmed this general finding for other disabilities. For example,
studies have found that children and adolescents with limb
deficiencies exhibit remarkably good psychosocial adjustment.66
People with spinal cord injuries report levels of well-being similar to
those of healthy controls,67 as do burn victims,68 patients with
into play, raise their aspirations to about the same extent as their actual
gains, and leave them feeling no happier than before. As a result, most
individuals spend a disproportionate amount of their lives working in
order to make money, and sacrifice family life and health, domains in
which aspirations remain fairly constant as actually circumstances
change, and where the attainment of one‘s goals has a more lasting
impact on happiness. Hence, a reallocation of time in favor of family
life and health would, on average, increase individual happiness.
Richard Easterlin, Explaining Happiness, 100 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT‘L ACAD. OF
SCI. 11,176, 11,178 (2003).
63
Philip Brickman et al., Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness
Relative?, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 917, 920-21 (1978).
64
Id.
65
See Diener et al., Beyond the Hedonic Treadmill: Revising the Adaptation
Theory of Well-Being, 61 AM. PSYCHOL. 305 (2006) (hereinafter BHT); Richard E.
Lucas, Adaptation and the Set-Point Model of Subjective Well-Being: Does
Happiness Change After Major Life Events?, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL.
SCI. 75 (2007).
66
Vida L. Tyc, Psychosocial Adaptation of Children and Adolescents with Limb
Deficiencies: A Review, 12 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 275 (1992).
67
C. Lundqvist et al., Spinal Cord Injuries: Clinical, Functional, and Emotional
Status, 16 SPINE 78 (1991).
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colostomies69 and those undergoing dialysis for treatment of kidney
disorders.70 As the authors of this last study note, ―Although
[hemodialysis patients] report their health as being much worse than
that of healthy controls, they do no appear to be much, if at all, less
happy than people who do not have kidney disease or any other
serious health condition.‖71
The aforementioned studies all applied a cross-sectional
methodology that compares the reported well-being of disabled people
with that of people who were not disabled. In a compelling new study
by economists Andrew Oswald and Nattavudh Powdthavee, the
authors track changes in subjective well-being longitudinally by
comparing happiness ratings of individuals before their disability with
assessments reported yearly following the disability.72 Since 1996, the
British Household Panel Survey has reported information on
respondents‘ psychological well-being and whether and to what extent
they suffer from a disability.73 In these surveys, respondents rated
their own level of happiness on a scale of 1 to 7, with larger numbers
indicating greater life satisfaction. Oswald and Powdthavee analyzed
the responses from people who originally reported no disability but
who subsequently became disabled during the course of the survey.
They divided these people into those who were moderately disabled
(―disabled but able to do day-to-day activities including housework,
climbing stairs, dressing oneself, and walking for at least 10 minutes‖)
and those who were seriously disabled (―unable to do at least one of
the above day-to-day activities‖).74
Oswald and Powdthavee‘s study produced noteworthy results.
As a group, people who become disabled report an average well-being
score of 4.8 for the two years preceding disability, an abrupt fall to 3.7
68

David R. Patterson et al., Psychological Effects of Severe Burn Injuries, 113
PSYCHOL. BULL. 362 (1993).
69
Norman F. Boyd et al., Whose Utilities for Decision Analysis?, 10 MED.
DECISION MAKING 58 (1990).
70
Jason Riis et al., Ignorance of Hedonic Adaptation to Hemodialysis: A Study
Using Ecological Momentary Assessment, 134 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 3 (2005).
71
Id. at 7.
72
Andrew J. Oswald & Nattavudh Powdthavee, Does Happiness Adapt? A
Longitudinal Study of Disability With Implications for Economists and Judges, J.
PUB. ECON. (forthcoming 2008) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=921040.
73
The survey contain over 10,000 adults who were interviewed between
September and December each year since 1991. Id. at 7.
74
Id. at 8. There were 675 person-year observations in the Moderately Disabled
category and 3,442 observations in the Severely Disabled category. Id.
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at the onset of disability, and then a subsequent rebound to 4.1 in the
two years that follow despite the fact that the disabilities themselves
have not changed.75 Separating the two groups, the authors find
approximately 50% adaptation to moderate disability and 30%
adaptation to severe disability.76 Thus, there is substantial evidence
that hedonic adaption to disability is significant (if incomplete).
Due to its considerable size and longitudinal nature, Oswald
and Powdthavee‘s recent study provides some of the strongest
evidence for adaptation to disability.77 It must be noted, however, that
the study also suggests that certain negative events appear to be more
difficult to adapt to. Low-level, chronic stimuli like noise, dull pain,
and headaches have substantial long-term effects on happiness, as do
diseases associated with progressive deterioration.78 One study, for
example, found that instead of adapting to noise problems, college
students actually became sensitized to it, experiencing higher levels of
annoyance as time went on.79 Others have shown that people are less
likely to adapt to unemployment80 and negative changes in marital
status such as divorce and separation.81 Most significantly for our
purposes, chronic or progressive disorders such as rheumatoid arthritis
and multiple schlerosis appear to be resistant to adaptation in part due
to the cumulatively deteriorating stimuli associated with such

75

Id. at 9.
Id. at 13–14. That is to say, over the course of two years moderately disabled
people recover approximately 50% of their ―lost‖ happiness, and even severely
disabled people regain more than 30% of the happiness they enjoyed before
becoming injured.
77
But see Richard E. Lucas, Long-term Disability is associated with lasting
changes in Subjective Well-Being: Evidence from Two Nationally Representative
Longitudinal Studies, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 717, 718 (2007) (finding
no evidence of adaptation from the same data set). Oswald and Powdthavee note
methodological differences between their paper and Lucas‘s, but, they write, ―we
cannot be certain why we find much more adaptation than does Lucas.‖ Oswald &
Powdthavee, supra note 72, at fn. 8.
78
See Frederick & Loewenstein, supra note 57, at 311-12.
79
Neil. D. Weinstein, Community Noise Problems: Evidence Against
Adaptation, 2 J. ENVIR. PSYCHOL. 87 (1992).
80
Richard E. Lucas et al., Unemployment Alters the Set Point for Life
Satisfaction, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 8 (2004).
81
Richard. E. Lucas et al., Reexamining Adaptation and the Set Point Model of
Happiness: Reactions to Changes in Marital Status, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 527 (2003).
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diseases.82 It is also worth pointing out that even where hedonic
adaptation occurs, it is neither inevitable nor invariable. Although
adaptation effects may be seen cumulatively, individuals experience a
range of responses to adaptable disabilities.83
Understanding which disabilities are adaptable and which are
not should lead to a better understanding of the mechanisms of
adaptation. We use the plural because it seems likely that hedonic
adaptation is not a single process but rather an assortment of
psychological processes. Adaptation may result from physiological
changes (such as increased upper body strength in paraplegics
enabling more effective wheelchair mobility) or from conscious and
unconscious cognitive changes in disabled people‘s interests, values,
and goals.84
Most recently, psychologists and economists have focused on
the role attention plays in moderating the effects of negative events.
Drawing an analogy between the psychological response to negative
events and the body‘s response to disease, Daniel Gilbert and
colleagues have suggested that people possess a ―psychological
immune system‖ that dampens the hedonic effect of disability.85
Defense mechanisms such as rationalization, dissonance reduction,
and positive illusions diminish the intensity of the emotional response
to disability by directing attention away from the disability and toward
new skills and new sources of pleasure. Similarly, Kahneman and
Thaler note that attention is normally directed towards novelty,
including changes in response to disability. Therefore, ―as the new
state loses its novelty it ceases to be the exclusive focus of attention,
and other aspects of life again evoke their varying hedonic
82

See C.A. Smith & K.A. Wallston, Adaptation in Patients with Chronic
Rheumatoid Arthritis: Application of a General Model, 11 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 151
(1992); R.F. Antonak & H. Livneh, Psychosocial Adaption to Disability and Its
Investigation Among Persons with Multiple Schlerosis, 40 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1099
(1995). Frederick and Loewenstein note, however, that the degree of adaptation may
be particularly difficult to measure with these progressive diseases. They write,
―Even maintaining a constant hedonic state in the face of these deteriorating
conditions would be impressive evidence of hedonic adaptation.‖ Frederick &
Loewenstein, supra note 57, at 312.
83
See Diener et al., BHT, supra note 65, at 310-311. The authors note, ―[W]e
have found individual differences in the rate and extent of adaptation that occurs
even to the same event. In our longitudinal studies, the size and even the direction of
the change in life satisfaction varied considerably across individuals.‖ Id. at 310.
84
See Frederick & Loewenstein, supra note 57, at 302-03.
85
Gilbert et al., supra note 7.
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responses.‖86 These coping strategies are evolutionarily adaptive,
allowing people to recover quickly from considerable misfortune.87
B. The Failure of Affective Forecasting—Focalism and
Immune Neglect
Although people are capable of hedonically adapting to a
variety of positive and negative life events, recent social scientific
research suggests that they consistently fail to anticipate such
adaptation. Over the past decade, psychologists and economists have
begun to study affective forecasting—people‘s ability to judge how
future experiences will make them feel.88 Most people, it turns out, do
a surprisingly poor job of predicting the intensity and the duration of
future feelings.89 This inability is particularly important in situations
concerning disability and adaptation.
When asked to predict how they will feel upon the occurrence
of some future hedonic event—eating a bowl of ice cream every day
for a week, having their favorite candidate win an election, being
denied tenure, or suffering an injury—people are able to estimate
whether that event will make them feel good or bad (valence) and
which emotions they will feel. They are not very good, however, at
predicting how strongly they will feel (intensity) or how long the
feeling will last (duration).90 For both positive and negative events,
people predict that they will feel more strongly than they actually do,
and they predict that the feeling will last longer than it actually does.
Accordingly, a growing number of studies have shown that, in the case
of physical disabilities, healthy people regularly predict that disabled
people will experience greater unhappiness for a longer period of time
than they actually do.91
86

Daniel Kahneman & Richard Thaler, Utility Maximization and Experienced
Utility, 20 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 221, 230 (2006).
87
See Lucas, supra note 77, at 718.
88
Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting: Knowing
What to Want, 14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 131 (2005) (hereinafter
AF).
89
For an excellent recent review, see Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson,
Prospection: Experiencing the Future, 317 SCIENCE 1351 (2007).
90
Wilson & Gilbert, AF, supra note 88.
91
See Peter A. Ubel et al., Disability and Sunshine: Can Hedonic Predictions Be
Improved by Drawing Attention to Focusing Illusions or Emotional Adaptation?, 11
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 111, 112 (2005) (hereinafter D&S); D.L.
Sackett & G.W. Torrance, The Utility of Different Health States as Perceived by the
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The most compelling explanation for the mispredictions
associated with affective forecasting suggests that people suffer from a
focusing illusion92 (also called focalism93) that causes them to pay too
much attention to the narrow aspects of life that will be affected by a
change while ignoring the much broader ways in which life will
remain the same.94 As Wilson et al. note, ―People think about the
focal event in a vacuum without reminding themselves that their lives
will not occur in a vacuum but will be filled with many other
events.‖95 For example, when people are asked to think about the
effect paraplegia would have on their lives, they tend to focus on the
limitations it will create rather than their unaltered ability to enjoy a
glass of wine or a conversation with friends.96 By directing their
attention to the changes wrought by disability, healthy people
underestimate how happy they will remain. This accounts for a
substantial amount of their mispredictions about affective intensity.
Faulty predictions about the duration of feelings associated
with negative events are often caused by a failure to anticipate how
rapidly the psychological immune system enables people to adapt to
unpleasant emotions. Gilbert et al. refer to this failure to predict

General Public, 32 J. CHRONIC DISEASES 697 (1978); Peter A. Ubel et al.,
Misimagining the Unimaginable: The Disability Paradox and Health Care Decision
Making, 24 (No. 4 Suppl.) HEALTH PSYCHOL. S57 (2005); Peter A. Ubel et al., Do
Nonpatients Underestimate the Quality of Life Associated with Chronic Health
Conditions Because of a Focusing Illusion, 21 MED. DECISION MAKING 190 (2007);
Boyd et al., supra note 69.
92
David A. Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Does Living in California Make
People Happy? A Focusing Illusion in Judgments of Life Satisfaction, 9 PSYCHOL.
SCI. 340 (1998). Ubel et al. define a focusing illusion as ―a failure to appreciate that
not all life domains or events will be equally affected by a given change in
circumstances.‖ Ubel et al., D&S, supra note 91, at 112.
93
Timothy D. Wilson et al., Focalism: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective
Forecasting, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 821 (2000).
94
Gilbert and Wilson discuss four reasons why affective forecasting errors
occur—mental simulations of future events tend to be unrepresentative,
essentialized, abbreviated, and decontextualized. Gilbert & Wilson, supra note 89,
at __. Summarizing the research, they write, ―[The mind‘s] simulations are deficient
because they are based on a small number of memories, they omit large numbers of
features, they do not sustain themselves over time, and they lack context. Compared
to sensory perceptions, mental simulations are mere cardboard cut-outs of reality.‖
Id.
95
Wilson et al, supra note 93, at 822.
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Ubel et al., D&S, supra note 91, at 113.
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adaptation as immune neglect.97 When asked to predict how long they
are likely to feel bad following a negative event, subjects ignore the
―set of dynamic psychological processes . . . that produce a change in
the relationship between what happens and how one feels.‖98 In a
separate paper, they note that the underestimation of hedonic
adaptation ―is probably the most commonly observed error in research
on hedonic prediction.‖99 When making predictions about future
changes, people tend to focus principally on the early stages of those
changes, when hedonic reactions are most intense. Adaptation, as
noted above, takes time, but the mental simulations people use to
predict later emotional states are tightly condensed. Ex ante
predictions thus tend to overvalue the intensely emotional change and
undervalue the long period of recovery and adaptation.100
Perhaps the most significant research on focusing illusions and
immune neglect is the increasing body of evidence indicating that
healthy people fail to predict the limited impact of disabilities on their
quality of life (QoL).101 One early study showed that, on a scale of 0
(conditions as bad as death) to 1 (perfect health), the general public
estimates that the quality of life for patients receiving dialysis is 0.39,
while dialysis patients report their QoL as 0.56.102 Similarly, patients
with colostomies rate their quality of life at 0.92, while patients
without colostomies predict that QoL with a colostomy would be
97

Ubel et al. describe a similar phenomenon that they call failure to consider
adaptation. They describe this failure as a distinct type of focusing illusion, noting,
―People who have read a description of paraplegia should recognize that paraplegia
does not affect the person‘s ability to enjoy a good TV show. However, they may
fail to consider that the grief they will feel upon finding out that they have paraplegia
will subside over time and that the sense of loss that they feel because they have to
abandon favorite pastimes will be replaced by the joy they derive from other
pastimes.‖ Id.
98
Id.
99
Gilbert & Wilson, supra note 89, at 1353.
100
Id.
101
As noted, the research compares the predictions of healthy people to the
actual ratings of disabled people. This research does not exactly match the situation
that we are concerned with in settlement negotiations, where the person making the
prediction is actually a recently injured victim. There is every reason to believe,
however, that the same biases affecting healthy people will also affect the recently
injured. The latter are just as likely (if not more likely) to suffer from abbreviated,
decontextualized, and essentialized simulations of future states because they will be
currently experiencing the intense hedonic effects that tend to improperly color
predictions.
102
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Hedonic Adaptation

24

0.80.103 And Schkade and Kahneman have found that people who
have known a paraplegic estimate that paraplegics spend considerably
more time in a good mood, while people who have not known a
paraplegic estimate that paraplegics spend more time in a bad mood.104
As the authors explain, ―The less you know about paraplegics, the
worse off you think they are.‖105 Part of the problem, they suggest, is
that when people are asked to make these predictions, they evaluate
the various outcomes as changes rather than states. Schkade and
Kahneman write, ―Common sense suggests that recent lottery winners
or the newly paraplegic will spend more of their time responding to
their special circumstances in the first few weeks than they will later.
Thus, if people judge what it is like to be a paraplegic by imagining
what it is like to become a paraplegic, they will exaggerate the longterm impact of this tragic event on life satisfaction.‖106 As we will
later argue, this focus on becoming rather than being may account for
certain aspects of victims‘ settlement behavior. When estimating the
sum that they feel will adequately compensate them for their injuries,
it is likely that recently injured plaintiffs will make the same kinds of
forecasting errors that healthy people make because their attention will
be directed towards the major changes brought about by disability.
Thus, they will likely overestimate the long-term hedonic impact of
their injuries.
C. Hedonic Adaptation and the Law
The practical implications of this wave of hedonic psychology
research have not escaped the notice of legal scholars. Much of the
research is specifically targeted toward policy-makers in the health
professions where new ideas about adaptation and focalism are likely
to challenge received wisdom about informed consent and end-of-life
decisions.107 That this research will also have profound consequences
103

Boyd et al., supra note 69, at 60.
Schkade & Kahneman, supra note 92.
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Id. at 340.
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Id. at 345.
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See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Jackie Snell, Predicting a Changing Taste: Do
People Know What They Will Like?, 5 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 187, 198
(1992). The authors note, ―[T]he value that is attached to ‗informed consent‘ to
surgery is surely limited if patients are incapable of assessing the quality of their
post-surgical lives.‖ Id.; see also Ubel et al., Misimagining the Unimaginable, supra
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for the law is becoming increasingly clear. Jeremy Blumenthal, for
example, has published an extensive evaluation of the implications of
affective forecasting failures for legal analysis.108 His work examines
subjects ranging from civil damages and capital punishment to
euthanasia and informed consent. Other scholars have focused
primarily on hedonic adaptation and tort law, and it will be useful to
describe some of their work in order to place our conclusions in
context.109
Oswald and Powdthavee, the economists who produced the
longitudinal study of British survey data discussed above, framed their
research in terms of its value for judges and juries awarding damages
in torts cases. The authors note the lack of rigor associated with the
assignment of pain and suffering awards based on ―conceptual
foundations that are, at best, ad hoc.‖110 Such damage awards are
note 91; Ubel et al., Do Non-Patients Underestimate, supra note 91; Boyd et al.,
supra note 69.
108
Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective
Forecasting, 80 IND. L.J. 155 (2005). Blumenthal discusses the implications of
affective forecasting research for a range legal issues including civil damage awards,
victim impact statements, the ―death row phenomenon,‖ sexual harassment,
surrogate mothering, euthanasia, advance directives, informed consent, and litigants‘
emotional expectations. In this last section, Blumenthal touches on the impact
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unlikely to account for the substantial hedonic adaptation that occurs
following an injury, and the authors propose to calculate an
appropriate schedule of payments that would compensate the victim
for changing levels of decreased quality of life. With sufficiently
accurate data regarding the increase in QoL associated with income
gains, they hope to be able to estimate the amount of money that
corresponds to the diminution in QoL in the years following an
accident.111
In a recent paper, Cass Sunstein also describes problems in the
way compensation for injuries is meted out by the legal system. He
notes that awards of hedonic damages are ―notoriously variable,‖ and
that they often appear irrational and incoherent.112 The literature on
hedonic adaptation, however, suggests an explanation for such awards.
Just as healthy people suffer from focusing illusions and immune
neglect that cause them to underestimate the extent to which disabled
people adapt to injuries, jurors are likely to ignore or misunderstand
adaptation to injuries when deciding on awards of hedonic damages.
The trial is basically a factory for the production of focusing illusions:
―The basic problem is that when asked to award damages for a certain
loss, the attention of the jury (and the judge) is fixated on the loss in
question. . . . Deliberately focused on a particular injury, juries are
unlikely to see that most of the time, the plaintiff may not be much
focused on the particular injury. The very circumstances of trial create
the focusing illusion.‖113 This focusing illusion—and the jury‘s failure
to consider the plaintiff‘s likely adaptation—will often result in
overcompensation for injuries with little lasting hedonic effect, the
―illusory losses‖ of Sunstein‘s title.114 Yet just as the social scientific
literature indicates why some plaintiffs are overcompensated, Sunstein
sees that it also suggests why other plaintiffs are likely to be
undercompensated. As noted above, some injuries, such as persistent
low-level pain, actually have long-lasting hedonic effects; they are, in
a sense, unadaptable.
Juries are unlikely to recognize such
111

Id. at 15. In an earlier draft of the paper, the authors attempted to calculate
specific sums that would be required to compensate victims for lost quality of life.
In the most recent draft, they have removed specific figures and are content with
suggesting the possibility of calculating approximate damage awards.
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Cass R. Sunstein, Illusory Losses, 3 (2007) available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=983810.
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distinctions, and the seemingly insignificant nature of the injury will
often occasion a small hedonic damage award.
In a recent article on hedonic damages and disability, Samuel
Bagenstos and Margo Schlanger also draw attention to the likelihood
of jurors misunderstanding the nature of hedonic adaptation. When
awarding compensation for hedonic damages, jurors tend to focus
inordinately on the limiting effects of disability and, as ostensibly
healthy people, fail to recognize how well most disabled people adapt.
Drawing on disability rights literature, Bagenstos and Schlanger
suggest that in having healthy jurors pass judgment on the quality of
life of disabled people, the legal system devalues the experiences of
people with disabilities and encourages the perception of disability as
a tragedy in need of pity and governmental support.115 Moreover, the
trial process, by making the plaintiff perform her disability in front of
the jury, itself becomes debilitating. The authors suggest that ―by
focusing on the negative feelings that occur during [the initial
adjustment period], plaintiffs with disabilities may delay or derail their
ultimate ability to adapt to their new condition.‖116 Accordingly, they
reach the conclusion that courts should not award hedonic damages for
lost quality of life arising from disability.117
As described above, the evidence for hedonic adaptation is
more complex than Bagenstos and Schlanger suggest. Recall that
while some disabilities seem to be highly adaptable, others, such as
those resulting in continuous or worsening pain, tend to be
115

Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic
Adaptation, and Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745, ___ (2008). They write:
When courts uphold hedonic damages awards based on the view that
disabling injuries limit life‘s enjoyment and keep plaintiffs from being a
‗whole person,‘ they entrench the societal view that disability is inherently
tragic, and encourage people with disabilities to see their lives as tragedies.
The view of disability as tragedy, for which the proper response is pity,
charity, or compensation, has been one of the major targets of disability
rights activists (and we endorse their campaign).
Id. at 130.
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Id. at 141.
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Id. at 130. They write:
For deterrence and compensation reasons, people who experience disabling
injuries should be able to recover for their physical pain; for medical
expenses and the cost of assistive technology and personal assistance; and
for the varied and costly accommodations that can enable them to
participate in our collective social life. But they should not recover for any
purported effect of disability on the enjoyment of life.
Id. at 106.
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unadaptable. The psychological literature indicates that responses to
disability may be conditioned by a number of factors, including the
nature of the disability.118 Moreover, even when adaptation does
occur, in most cases it is incomplete. People do not tend to recover
fully; there is often some lasting, if surprisingly small, hedonic
effect.119
Although hedonic adaptation may be variable and
incomplete, its implications for the law are no less significant. Our
account of these implications turns, for the first time, to the role
adaptation and focalism may play in the settlement of legal disputes.
III.

HEDONIC ADAPTATION AND IMPROVED SETTLEMENT
OPPORTUNITIES

Consider the class of injuries that involve ongoing disabilities
or losses of function, but not continuous pain—in other words, those
to which humans are capable of adapting hedonically.120 Where these
types of injuries give rise to lawsuits for personal injury, hedonic
adaptation will likely instigate a greater number of settlements than
standard models would predict. Hedonic adaptation‘s effect on the
settlement process is twofold. First, by the time a trial is set to occur,
many personal injury plaintiffs will have adjusted to their injuries and
concomitantly reduced their settlement demands. Second, plaintiffs
will understand—consciously or unconsciously—that settlement (or
―closure‖ by some other means) is essential to the process of hedonic
adaptation and opt to end litigation more expeditiously as a result.
A. Adaptation as Inducement to Settle
The long delays associated with the civil litigation process are
commonly thought of as a source of costs to the system, costs that
118

See Marcel Dijkers, Quality of Life After Spinal Cord Injury: A Meta
Analysis of the Effects of Disablement Components, 35 SPINAL CORD 829 (1997).
Dijkers points to the effects of occupation, family life, mobility, and social
integration play in individual responses to disability. Id. at 836-37.
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See Oswald & Powdthavee, supra note 72; Lucas, supra note 77.
120
Injuries or conditions that fall into this category include loss of limb, partial
paralysis, loss of sexual function, blindness or deafness, and a variety of other
disabilities that will eventually heal to the point that the subject is no longer in pain,
but not to the point that the subject regains the lost functionality. For a more
complete description, see Part II, supra.

Hedonic Adaptation

29

should be avoided whenever possible. On their own, of course,
drawn-out litigation procedures raise the costs of litigating to both
sides (and to the public at large), as all parties are forced to devote
more time and resources to the litigation. Lengthy litigation periods
also delay the arrival of redress to the tort victim.121 In so doing, they
may make potential plaintiffs less likely to litigate in the first instance,
or less likely to follow through with already commenced litigation, as
the means of support that might allow the victim to pursue litigation
disappear.122 For these reasons, the most prominent attempts at civil
litigation reform have focused on alternative methods of dispute
resolution—in particular, arbitration123—that are designed to curb
costs primarily by increasing the speed at which cases are handled and
decided and eliminating many of the procedures that typically serve to
retard the rapid progression of litigation matters.
At the same time, these procedural delays are likely to have
salutary effects on the litigation system as well. The explanation rests
with the psychological healing that the injury victim will undergo
during the period before trial. During the first few months that follow
a severe injury—a period of time that includes the filing of litigation
and the initial pre-trial procedures—the plaintiff is likely to suffer
from a focusing illusion. With his attention focused on his injury, the
plaintiff will overestimate its impact on his future happiness: he will
anticipate that the injury will prevent him from achieving the same
enjoyment of life that he experienced before being hurt.124
However, during the nearly two years that it takes a typical
civil case to reach trial, the plaintiff is likely to adapt hedonically to
his injury—even if that injury is permanent—and will report levels of
happiness very close to his pre-injury levels.125 Two years after a
plaintiff has suffered an injury, the plaintiff will likely view that injury
as far less severe, far less debilitating, and generally far less important
than he did in the months following the accident.126 This adaptation
will have two relevant effects. First, the degree to which a plaintiff
believes he has been ―wronged‖ will dissipate. His sense of the scale
121
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of the indignity that has been perpetrated against him will diminish.
Second, the amount of money that the plaintiff believes will fairly
compensate him for his injury—will ―make him whole,‖ in the typical
parlance of tort damages—will decrease. Immediately after a serious
injury, a plaintiff is likely to feel that only a sizeable amount of money
will adequately compensate him for the loss of function that he has
suffered; two years later, when the plaintiff has had the opportunity to
hedonically adapt and the injury seems less debilitating, what the
plaintiff perceives as appropriate compensation will decline as well.127
In combination, these two effects will drive down a tort
plaintiff‘s settlement price. Consider, for instance, a plaintiff who
loses a limb in a traffic accident (through no fault of his own).
Imagine that in the months that follow the injury, when the lawsuit is
initially filed, the plaintiff views his injury as highly incapacitating
and believes (a rough estimate, of course) that he will need $280,000
to make him whole.128 Over the course of the two years between filing
and trial, the plaintiff adapts to his injury and comes to believe that
only $140,000 is necessary to fairly compensate him for the harm he
127

See Part I.C., supra. We certainly do not mean to suggest that all types of
tort damages are susceptible to adaptation. Tort damages typically comprise a
variety of linked payments designed to compensate the plaintiff for various aspects
of his injury. Plaintiffs can recover damages for medical expenses and economic
costs (typically lost wages due to disability) incurred as a result of the injury. These
expenses are not ―adaptable‖ in the sense we describe here; a plaintiff‘s view of
these costs is unlikely to change. But plaintiffs may also recover damages for
present and future pain and suffering, and in many jurisdictions they are permitted to
recoup so-called ―hedonic‖ damages to compensate for lost enjoyment of their lives.
See generally, Sunstein, supra note 112, at 3-4 & nn. 4-11; Edward P. Berla et al.,
Hedonic Damages and Personal Injury: A Conceptual Approach, J. FORENSIC
ECONOMICS (1990). For specific examples of hedonic damage awards, see, e.g.,
Allen v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 241 F.3d 1293, 1297 (10th Cir. 2001) (loss of ability
to ride horses); Day v. Ouachita Parish School Bd., 823 So.2d 1039, 1044 (La. Ct.
App. 2002) (loss of ability to play high school sports). Plaintiffs will adjust to the
losses for which these latter types of damages are meant to compensate. Pain and
suffering awards constitute approximately fifty percent of the total value of monetary
damages in personal injury cases, see Neil Vidmar et al., Jury Awards for Medical
Malpractice and Post-Verdict Adjustments of Those Awards, 48 DEPAUL L. REV.
265, 296 (1998); W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and Suffering in Product Liability Cases:
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has suffered.129 Irrespective of the fact that the expected jury award
will not have changed, the plaintiff will likely see a lower settlement
amount as appropriate given the apparent amelioration of his injury.130
As the plaintiff‘s settlement price declines, the chances of settlement
increase131—perhaps even substantially, commensurate with the
significant degree of hedonic adaptation that humans typically
experience.132
Civil settlements are valuable cost-saving
mechanisms,133 and many of the principal rules of civil litigation are
designed with the goal of encouraging settlement in mind.134 Hedonic
adaptation operates as a significant background complement to these
rules.135
129

This is a reasonable approximation of a typical plaintiff‘s ability to adapt. As
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of personal injury plaintiffs are represented by attorneys working on a contingent-fee
basis. Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of Champions
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This is not to say, of course, that drawn-out litigation
procedures are effective at driving parties toward settlement only
insofar as they permit the psychological immune system to operate.
Discovery allows parties to eliminate the uncertainties that surround
each side‘s analysis of the case and thereby narrow the gap between
their respective valuations.
Nor do we mean to claim that hedonic adaptation—and the
increased prospects for settlement that it carries—necessarily justifies
each and every procedural piece of the civil litigation puzzle from a
cost-benefit perspective. The marginal adaptation generated by a
particular procedural rule may be very slight, despite the fact that it
imposes severe costs upon the parties (and offers little else of value).
Rather, we mean only to argue that the current cost-benefit accounting
of the civil trial process is incorrect, and biased toward overestimation of litigation costs.136 By drawing upon and facilitating
hedonic adaptation, the civil trial process manages to recoup for
litigants some of the costs that the extensive pre-litigation procedures
would appear to impose upon them.
B. Settlement as Adaptive Mechanism
The concept of ―closure‖ as an end goal for crime and tort
victims has gained tremendous currency in recent years. According to
conventional psychological wisdom, a victim gains something of value
from achieving a sense of finality regarding the crime or tort
committed against him.137 Within the criminal law, courts and
legislatures have attempted to facilitate the search for closure both by
affording victims the opportunity to participate more directly in the
final stages of a trial138 or by foreshortening the process of trial and
911–12 ("The lawyer could settle many cases in the time it takes to litigate one, so it
is rational for her to settle quickly even if doing so reduces her profit in the
individual case."); Charles Silver, Class Actions—Representative Proceedings, in 5
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 194, 213 (B. Bouckaert & G. De Geest
eds., 2000). Thus, it is the rare contingent-fee attorney who will stand in the way of
an adapted plaintiff‘s desire to settle.
136
See Part I, supra.
137
See generally Susan Bandes, Victims, “Closure,” and the Sociology of
Emotion (unpublished manuscript; draft on file with author).
138
Douglas E. Beloof et al, Constitutional Implications of Crime Victims as
Participants, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 282 (2003); Elizabeth Beck et al, Seeking
Sanctuary: Interviews with Family Members of Capital Defendants, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 382, 387-90 (2003) (describing the victims‘ rights movement). The Supreme
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appeal in the interests of bringing proceedings to a close more
expeditiously.139 This emphasis on closure does not fall neatly into
classical economic models or categories of preferences. Under
standard economic assumptions, the most that might be said is that
individuals derive utility by achieving finality—by being able to put
one matter aside as successfully completed in order to focus on others.
Here, ―closure‖ is an end in itself, and one of dubious pedigree at that.
Studies of hedonic adaptation provide an alternative, deeper
explanation. For a tort plaintiff, ―closure‖ means the definitive end to
legal proceedings and the end of one setting in which the plaintiff
might be reminded of his condition. On this account, realizing closure
from a lawsuit is a means of facilitating the process of hedonic
adaptation. Humans are thus conditioned to seek closure and
finality—particularly with respect to painful episodes in the past—in
order to abet their psychological immune systems. The more quickly
and completely a plaintiff can put matters concerning an accident
behind him and ―move on,‖ the sooner his psychological immune
system can bury thoughts of his injury and adapt the plaintiff
hedonically to his new circumstances. Relatedly, a number of studies
Court has appeared to endorse the search for closure as one of the principal
rationales supporting the constitutionality of victim impact statements. See Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 832 (O‘Connor, J., concurring) (―Murder is the ultimate
act of depersonalization. It transforms a living person with hopes, dreams, and fears
into a corpse, thereby taking away all that is special and unique about the person.
The Constitution does not preclude a State from deciding to give some of that
back.‖); Robert P. Mosteller, Victim Impact Evidence: Hard to Find the Real Rules,
88 CORNELL L. REV. 543, 550 (2003) (referring to Justice O‘Connor‘s concurrence
and explaining that ―the argument is styled in terms of returning something to the
murder victims themselves, but obviously that action is symbolic. Its impact is for
the benefit of the victims‘ families and friends . . . .‖).
139
See e.g. Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2006) (explaining that the
government‘s interests in precluding post-conviction access to evidence included
―guarding against a flood of requests, protecting the finality of convictions, and
ensuring closure for victims and survivors‖) (emphasis added); Skaggs v.
Commonwealth, 2005 WL 2314073, at 5 (2005) (―Surely the family and friends of
the two victims are entitled to some consideration as to the closure of these grisly
and senseless murders—24 years have passed. The legal process afforded the
convicted killer has been much more than due.‖); State v. Korsen, 111 P.3d 130
(Idaho 2005) (―With the enactment of I.C. § 19-5304(2), there is a strong public
policy ground for not abating a criminal conviction. If the conviction is abated, it
may abate the restitution order because, under the statute, a conviction or finding of
guilt is necessary for an order of restitution. Further, abatement of the conviction
would deny the victim of the fairness, respect and dignity guaranteed by these laws
by preventing the finality and closure they are designed to provide.‖).
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have demonstrated a strong correlation between an injury victim‘s
level of control or agency over his life and his success at hedonic
adaptation.140 A plaintiff‘s ability to settle his own personal injury
lawsuit may itself contribute to his psychological recovery.
Humans may understand these processes at a conscious level—
the search for closure may be deliberate and knowing—or only at an
unconscious one—and thus seek closure for reasons not entirely
known or understood. On either account, people will act to their own
hedonic advantage by seeking closure on matters that have the
potential to reinvigorate painful memories.
Plaintiffs are thus likely to view settlement as the most ready
means by which to gain closure and smooth the progress of
psychological repair. Though discussion of settlement may itself
invoke painful memories,141 plaintiffs will understand that their longterm happiness rests on their capacity to end a lawsuit that would
otherwise retard hedonic adaptation. Accordingly, when evaluating a
lawsuit‘s prospects of settlement, the possibility of achieving closure
is not merely an independent, unquantifiable variable in the plaintiff‘s
welfare function.142 In the context of many types of personal injury
lawsuits, closure is shorthand for the hedonic advantage that a plaintiff
can realize from settling the case before trial. In cases involving
injuries that permit significant hedonic adaptation,143 plaintiffs will
seek out settlement for exactly that reason.144
140

Magnus L. Elfstrom et al., Relations Between Coping Strategies and HealthRelated Quality of Life in Patients with Spinal Cord Lesion, 37 J. REHABIL. MED. 9
(2005); I. Ville et al., Subjective Well-Being and Severe Motor Impairments: The
Tetrafigap Survey on the Long-Term Outcome of Tetraplegic Spinal Cord Injured
Persons, 52 SOC. SCI & MED. 369 (2001); Richard Schulz & Susan Decker, Longterm Adjustment to Physical Disability: The Role of Social Support, Perceived
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See Part IV.C., infra.
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For a list of such injuries, see Part II, supra.
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Accordingly, it should not come as a surprise that empirical studies regarding
participation by victims and their families in the sentencing phase of criminal
trials—participation that is driven by a desire to achieve closure—reveal mixed or
non-existent effects. See Bandes, supra note 137, at 25-35. If ―closure‖ serves
primarily as a means of furthering hedonic adaptation, a process of seeking closure
will confer few benefits upon participants if it requires continued rehashing of the
events that brought about the hedonic downturn in the first instance.
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EXTENSIONS AND OBJECTIONS

The foregoing Parts set forth our case for adaptation‘s power as
an inducement to settlement. In the sections that follow, we outline a
number of ways in which we might test these theories empirically, and
we confront several of the most significant potential objections to our
behavioral framework.
A. Testable Predictions
One of the strengths of our approach is that it generates
testable hypotheses regarding settlement rates for particular types of
civil cases. Consider two hypothetical personal injury lawsuits, one in
which the plaintiff has lost some mobility in an auto accident, and one
in which the plaintiff—as the result of a workplace injury—now
suffers from recurring migraine headaches.145 These two cases, if
brought in the same jurisdiction, will involve symmetric pre-trial
procedures: discovery, mediation, motions to dismiss and for summary
judgment, and so forth. A priori, there is every reason to expect that
any divergences between the plaintiff and defendant in each case—
informational asymmetries, discrepancies in litigation valuation, etc.—
will themselves be symmetric across cases. Imagine further that the
two cases have approximately equivalent expected values when
litigated before a jury. Based on these considerations alone, the auto
accident plaintiff and the workplace accident plaintiff should be
equally likely to settle before trial.
The lone difference between these cases, as conceived here, is
that the auto injury plaintiff will likely be able to adapt to his loss of
function while the workplace injury plaintiff will not. The loss of
mobility is a paradigm case for the power of hedonic adaptation;
studies have shown that even people who lose the power to walk
return to nearly pre-injury levels of happiness.146 By contrast,
145

Sunstein discusses this dichotomy in Sunstein, supra note 112, at 19. For
examples of cases involving enduring, non-adaptable injuries, see Creative Label
Co., Inc., 203 W.Va. 428 (1998); Chambers v. Advanced Processing Systems, 853
So. 2d 984 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004); Levy v. Bayou Indus. Maint Serv., 855 So 2d 968,
980 (La. Ct. App. 2003); Hunt v. Mercy Medical Center, 710 A.2d 362 (Md. App.
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recurrent conditions such as headaches and ringing in the ears present
(as described above) among the worst cases for adaptation.147 By the
time that the several years of pre-trial machinations have run their
course, the workplace injury plaintiff is likely to perceive himself as
still suffering in a way that the auto accident plaintiff genuinely does
not. The auto injury plaintiff will be willing to settle for a range of
values that the workplace injury plaintiff would still consider
inadequate. Our theory thus generates three predictions:
1. During the time between filing and trial, settlement demands from
plaintiffs with adaptable injuries will decrease in value by greater
margins than settlement demands from plaintiffs with non-adaptable
injuries.
2. Consequently, personal injury cases involving adaptable injuries
will settle at higher rates than personal injury cases involving nonadaptable injuries, ceteris paribus.
3. Independent of the effects of costs and informational advantages,
hedonic adaptation will cause settlement rates for adaptable personal
injury to increase as the time between filing and trial increases.
This last hypothesis warrants further explanation. Lengthy
pre-trial procedures have the capacity to induce settlement in two ways
that are orthogonal to our analysis here. First, they may increase the
costs of proceeding along the path to trial, thus rendering pre-trial
settlement more attractive. Second, they frequently (though not
always) serve to provide the parties with greater information regarding
the respective strengths of their cases, information that narrows the
gap between the parties‘ subjective valuations and facilitates accord.148
Consider, then, a set of accelerated pre-trial procedures that provide
the same informational gains to the parties as standard litigation
practices and generate the same level of costs. A simply accelerated
litigation calendar—for instance, the Eastern District of Virginia‘s
famous ―rocket docket‖149—would possess this feature. We predict
147
148
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Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 829 & n. 34 (2006).

Hedonic Adaptation

37

that cases litigated on such an accelerated schedule will settle at a
lower rate than cases litigated at a more deliberate speed.
Empirical tests of these hypotheses are beyond the scope of
this article. Nonetheless, the necessary data, particularly concerning
hypotheses #2 and #3, should be relatively easy to obtain. Empirical
analysis of the hedonic adaptation has matured into a vigorous
science;150 we hope that empirical research into adaptation‘s effects on
the trial process will soon follow suit.
B. Principal Objections
1.

Focalism in Settlement Negotiations

While the evidence supporting theories of hedonic adaptation
has by this point become quite robust,151 psychologists and economists
remain divided and uncertain as to the methods and mechanisms by
which it operates. Candidate theories focus on changes in the victim‘s
aspirations,152 memories,153 and interpretations of the negative event‘s
meaning.154 Nonetheless, the leading hypothesis is the notion that
humans are simply capable of blocking out or ignoring losses and
limitations, even when they affect matters of daily life.155 For
instance, an individual who becomes paralyzed below the waist and
relegated to a wheelchair may occasionally be reminded of the fact
that she is in a wheelchair and is therefore incapable of many typical
activities. But for the most part her injury is low-wattage background
noise; she neither thinks about it nor perceives the ways in which it
limits her. As Daniel Kahneman, the pioneer of this theory, has
explained in particularly pithy form: ――Nothing in life matters quite as
much as you think it does while you are thinking about it.‖156
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This ―focalism‖157 raises the possibility that settlement
negotiations, which we posit here as a beneficial side effect of hedonic
adaptation, may be self-defeating. The very fact of negotiating a
settlement to the plaintiff‘s lawsuit might remind the plaintiff of the
severity (or existence) of his condition, subvert the process of hedonic
adjustment, and return the plaintiff, at least momentarily, to his
diminished post-injury state of happiness.
Settlement-induced
―hedonic relapse‖ could re-inflate the plaintiff‘s perception of the
severity of his injury and its worth.
Though this counter-productive effect may occur in many
settings, we do not believe it poses a serious threat to the settlementforcing adaptation that we‘ve detailed here. Typical settlement
negotiations do not involve the type of discussions that are most likely
to trigger hedonic relapse. Late-period settlement negotiations are
most likely to revolve around dollar figures, and nothing more.
At the inception of litigation, before the parties have conducted
discovery and fully defined the scope of claims, any negotiations
between the plaintiff and defendant—indeed, any conversations
between the plaintiff and his attorney—are likely to revolve around the
scope of the plaintiff‘s injury. The plaintiff‘s (or defendant‘s) attorney
may intend for the plaintiff to visit an additional set of doctors; the
parties may be uncertain as to the extent of the plaintiff‘s injury; and
the plaintiff himself may not know or understand the long-term
lifestyle effects of his condition. These types of interactions cannot
help but retard the process of hedonic adaptation.
As other scholars have noted, the trial itself is also likely to
create negative focalism effects.158 The plaintiff will be seated in
court every day as the parties rehash the plaintiff‘s injury and debate
the continuing effects of that injury upon the plaintiff‘s life. The
plaintiff will hear expert testimony from both sides regarding his
health and disability. And he will likely be called upon to testify about
his accident and his continuing health. Even if the plaintiff has
succeeded in adapting hedonically by the time that his case reaches
trial, the trial itself is likely to undo those gains.
157
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Yet between the initial stages of the litigation and the trial, the
plaintiff‘s health holds very little day-to-day importance. Once the
plaintiff‘s condition has become a known quantity, there is no further
need for the sides to discuss it.159 It is during this period that the
plaintiff‘s adaptive response begins to operate, as the injury and the
medically intensive inception of litigation both begin to fade into the
background.
If the case does not settle shortly after it is filed, this fallow
period may be punctuated by settlement offers and negotiations by
both sides. These interactions, however, bear little resemblance in
form or substance to the type of emotional presentations that
characterize a personal injury trial. By this point, settlement offers are
likely to take the form of suggested dollar figures, and little else. By
the time that the parties reach the negotiating table, the attorneys will
have latched onto approximate case valuations and acceptable
settlement ranges, and reaching agreement on a particular number will
be the sole priority.
Importantly, plaintiffs are most often bystanders to these
negotiations. Any conversation between the plaintiff and his attorney
will almost certainly concern only whether the plaintiff wishes to
accept a proffered settlement offer or hold out for more money.160
Much has been made of the attorney-client relationship as a classic
principal-agent problem.161 According to the standard model of
attorney-client relations, the attorney manages the litigation and
structures the investigation, analysis, and discussion of the relevant
issues in order to impel the client towards her (the attorney‘s)
preferred outcomes. This litigation structure is commonly thought of
as imposing costs upon plaintiffs—and upon third parties who may
depend on litigation to provide remuneration and deterrence—through
159
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the potential misalignment of incentives.162 Yet in personal injury
cases, the attorney‘s function as an emotional screen may help
facilitate hedonic adaptation and confer genuine benefits on litigants
from both sides.
2. Civil Damages as Adaptive Mechanism?
Modern research on happiness and hedonic adaptation quite
obviously poses a number of challenges to classical economic models.
Standard rational-choice economics would predict that a loss of
function or capability would have substantial long-term effects on a
person‘s happiness. Deprivation of the option value of a set of
previously held capabilities—and thus of a variety of forms of activity
and entertainment—would cause the disabled person to be less happy
in the long run, assuming that perfect substitutes for those activities
are unavailable.163 Moreover, standard economic models would
predict that a person‘s happiness level should not change without a
material change in that person‘s circumstances or an exogenously
forced change in preferences. The very existence of hedonic
adaptation belies these predictions.
In response to the burgeoning literature on happiness,
economists have proposed a number of explanations that would
account for evidence of adaptation within the confines of classical
rational-choice understandings of human behavior.
The most
162
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plausible explanation posits that studies that purport to find hedonic
adaptation are in fact succeeding only in capturing precisely the
changes in circumstance that economists predict would raise happiness
levels in the wake of serious injury or disability.164 In other words,
tort victims are increasingly happy over time not because their
psychological immune systems have successfully adapted them to
their injuries, but because insurance payments, tort settlements, or
even increased attention from family and friends have kicked in and
restored them to their prior hedonic level. Economists view this as an
indication that insurance and tort settlements are achieving the proper
effect, genuinely functioning as ―make whole‖ remedies for accident
victims.
Were this the case, it would pose a significant challenge to the
theory we advance here. If what appears to be ―hedonic adaptation‖ is
only a product of the successful resolution of lawsuits and insurance
claims, then our causal arrow points in precisely the wrong direction.
Yet the data do not appear to support this view. If cash
payments via insurance or tort lawsuits were driving hedonic
improvements, personal income should serve as the best indicator for
when hedonic adaptation will occur, and when income is held constant
researchers should find no evidence of adaptation. However, studies
of people with moderate and severe disabilities produce evidence of
hedonic adaptation even after controlling for household income.165
Likewise, if injury victims were adapting because of increased
involvement by their family and friends, we would expect that
differences in family structure or marital status would largely explain
observed hedonic adaptation. Again, this has not proven to be the
case. Family size and marital status—along with income—have
statistically meaningful effects on the rate and extent of post-injury
adaptation.166 But not only do those effects not account for the
entirety of adaptation, they are dwarfed by the adaptation that appears
to occur for reasons having nothing to do with family size or
structure.167 The conclusion we draw from these studies is that while
wealth and a supportive family may aid the process of hedonic
164
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adaptation, the normal functioning of the psychological immune
system alone will be enough to drive adaptation, and thus spur
settlement.
CONCLUSION
In the wake of a devastating or crippling injury, it is only
natural for most people to believe that their future lives will be
significantly impacted, their future happiness severely diminished. In
keeping with these dire predictions, it is not surprising that victims
who bring suit against their injurers will initially demand large
compensating awards, certain that those payments will be necessary if
they are to have any hope of returning to their pre-injury quality of
life. In reality, however, we now know that humans can adapt readily
to even debilitating injuries. A scant two years after losing a limb or
the ability to walk, an accident victim often will have returned almost
completely to the level of happiness he experienced prior to the injury.
This human capacity for hedonic adaptation is likely to have profound
consequences on the tort suits that personal injury victims bring
against their tortfeasors. The typical personal injury lawsuit drags on
for almost two years from the date it is filed until the day that it
reaches trial. In the course of these two years, adaptation will drive
down the settlement prices for many personal injury plaintiffs,
enlarging the available window for negotiation between plaintiffs and
defendants and increasing the rate of settlement. The passage of some
appreciable span of time is essential to the process; were civil
litigation not prone to such stagnation, the psychological immune
system would have no time within which to operate. Procedural
delays—long derided as unnecessary sources of costs and delay to
litigants—thus function simultaneously as the means by which
plaintiffs and defendants in personal injury cases are able to sidestep
lengthy and expensive trials.
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